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Abstract The direct ownership structure in a sector can be readily obtained from
data on shareholding. Due to cross-shareholding, however, the true ownership structure
may be hidden by a complex network of indirect relations. In studying the property
structure, two important aspects are the size of the relations between primary owners
(e.g. individuals) and secondary owners (e.g. companies), and the distance between
them. The distance is obtained from the average number of secondary owners via
whom the relation runs. As an empirical application, we study the banking sector
in the Czech Republic, where also the relation between distance and separation of
dividend and control rights is discussed.
Keywords Cross-shareholding · Ownership relations · Dividend and control rights ·
Input-output analysis
JEL Classification L16 · G32 · D57
1 Introduction
The ownership structure of an economy is nowadays often characterized by a complex
network of interdependent owners. For example, individual A owns a share in company
B, who has a share in company C . In its turn, C owns a share in B. Although A has
no direct interest in C , there is an indirect relation via B. If the operating surplus of C
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increases, A benefits through its shares in B. If the operating surplus of B increases,
A benefits not only directly but also indirectly (for instance, via the gains in C that
are beneficial to B again). This is just a very simple case, but it suffices to sketch
the setting. Using pure accounting identities, Bolle and Güth (1992) constructed a
general model of such interdependent property structures and arrived at the Leontief
input-output scheme (see also Turnovec 1999, 2005). In particular, they showed that
eliminating all indirect ownership relations results in the final or true distribution of
property over the individual owners.
There is a huge body of literature on ownership structures, but only few papers deal
with the indirect effects arising from the so called “cross-shareholding” of companies.
Due to cross-shareholding, companies have indirect interests in each other. In the liter-
ature this structure of ownership and control is also called an “insider system”, which
is an integral feature of Japanese, German and Swedish business groups in particular
(see e.g. Kester 1992). Franks and Mayer (1995) distinguish two types of ownership
structures: insider and outsider systems. An insider (or enterprise-oriented) system has
a small number of listed companies, an illiquid capital market with infrequent trade of
ownership and control, and complex systems of intercorporate holdings. In contrast,
an outsider (or market oriented) system is characterized by the existence of a large
number of listed companies, a liquid capital market with frequent trade of ownership
and control rights, and few intercorporate holdings. In general, it is believed that Con-
tinental Europe and Japan have an insider system of ownership structure, while the
Anglo-American system is market oriented.
Although indirect interests (such as the one sketched above) have been recog-
nized in the literature (see e.g. Bresnahan and Salop 1986; Reynolds and Snapp 1986;
Flath 1989, 1991), only few papers take them into full account by implementing such
interests in the models that are used. For example, Ellerman (1991, 1995) studies
the cross ownership relations between corporations and uses the input-output frame-
work to develop the so called primal and dual theories of ownership and control. His
model is particularly relevant for control questions and the proportional representa-
tion scheme in voting systems. In a series of papers, Flath (1992a,b, 1993) measures
indirect shareholding for six major keiretsu groups in Japan. He shows that indi-
rect shareholding in these groups is large, and should not be neglected because there
are gains from indirect shareholding (which might explain the existence of keiretsu
groups). Such gains were quantified by Dietzenbacher et al. (2000) in an empirical
study for the Dutch financial sector (see also Merlone 2001). The effects of cross-
shareholding for collusion were studied by Reitman (1994), Alley (1997) and Gilo
et al. (2006).
The cross-shareholding of companies may result in a complex network of interde-
pendent relations between economic agents.1 Analyzing complexity and relatedness
of national production structures, has induced a considerable amount of input-output
research (going back to Yan and Ames 1965). In this paper, we want to quantify
1 It should be noted that the term “cross-shareholding” as used in the industrial organization literature
includes all kinds of ownership relations that are distinguished in the finance literature. These include
pyramiding structure, one-sided shareholdings, and mutual (reciprocal) shareholdings (which also includes
“ring-form” links).
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ownership interrelatedness (and ownership network complexity) in an economy
between primary owners (e.g. individuals, the state, municipalities, individuals’ non-
profit associations) and secondary owners (e.g. companies, banks, industrial corpora-
tions) that is the consequence of cross-shareholding links. In doing so, we take into
account not only the size of direct and indirect shareholdings, but also the “average
distance” between primary owners and secondary owners. The latter is obtained from
the average number of secondary owners via whom such shareholding links between
primary owners and secondary owners run.
Taking indirect ownership relations into full account has important theoretical and
empirical implications. First, a primary owner may indirectly own a substantial part
of some secondary owner, although there may be no direct interest at all. Using the
observed property distribution for various purposes (e.g. valuing the property embed-
ded in shares that primary owners hold in secondary owners, assessing decision making
power, identifying the role of the state or any other primary owner, finding the dis-
tribution of national property or profits) may be quite misleading. In the presence of
cross-shareholding, the observed direct ownership distribution may be very different
from the true property distribution that incorporates indirect linkages as well.
Second, quantifying indirect ownership relations allows for comparing different
sectors in an economy and/or different economies. In some cases, however, qualitative
judgments are immediately clear because the shareholding matrices exhibit certain
characteristics (such as reducibility).
Third, it would be of interest to link measures of indirect property relations to
financial performance indicators. For example, the empirical evidence of the effect
of cross-shareholding on corporate performance is ambiguous (see e.g. Prowse 1990;
Flath 1993; Lichtenberg and Pushner 1994; Weinstein and Yafeh 1995, 1998; Morck
et al. 2000; Yafeh and Yosha 2003). The stable shareholding in Japan, which persisted
for almost three decades, began to unwind dramatically in the 1990s.2 This raised
many fundamental questions about causes, effects and implications of the changes in
the Japanese ownership structure. Quantifying ownership relations may shed a new
light on the link between ownership structure and corporate performance.
Finally, there is a clear link between our measures of ownership network complexity
and the degree of separation of dividend and control rights, widely studied in the finance
literature (see e.g. La Porta et al. 1999, 2002; Bebchuk et al. 2000; Claessens et al.
2000; Faccio et al. 2001; Faccio and Lang 2002; Attig and Gadhoum 2003; Gadhoum
2005; Dorofeenko et al. 2008). Cross-shareholding is one of the most important control
enhancement devices and our proposed measures of distance take this into full account.
We show that, as a consequence, our distance concept can be used as an alternative
measure of separation of ownership and control. Ownership relations that are more
complex and non-negligible in size may be expected to exhibit a larger gap between
dividend and control rights.
2 According to Nippon Life Insurance Research Institute (NLIRI) the stable shareholder ratio, defined as the
ratio of shares owned by commercial banks, insurance companies, and other non-financial firms (business
partners and the parent company) to the total of issued shares of listed firms (calculated on a value basis),
was 45% in the early 1990s, but decreased to 27% in 2002.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Leontief-
type model of property structure. New measures of ownership network complexity
are developed in Sect. 3. The method has been applied to the banking sector of the
Czech Republic, the results of which are discussed in Sect. 4. Also in that section,
we explore the link to the finance literature, studying the separation of ownership and
control. The summary and conclusions are presented in Sect. 5.
2 Basics of the Leontief-type model of ownership structure
The main point of departure is the model of property structure, developed by Bolle
and Güth (1992) to study a complex network of interdependent owners (see also
Turnovec 1999, 2005). Essentially, there are two types of economic agents: principal
or primary owners (e.g. individuals, the state, municipalities) and intermediary or sec-
ondary owners (e.g. companies, banks, industrial corporations). Principal owners can
own intermediary institutions, but cannot be owned themselves. Intermediary insti-
tutions can own other intermediary institutions, but are surely owned themselves (by
primary and other secondary owners). Due to this cross-shareholding of intermediary
owners, principal owners may have no (or little) direct interest in some intermediary
owner, but a huge indirect interest (via other secondary institutions).
Suppose there are m primary owners and n secondary owners. The n × m matrix
P gives the direct primary property distribution. Element pik indicates the share in
company i(= 1, . . ., n) that is held by primary owner k(= 1, . . ., m). The n×n matrix
S denotes the secondary property distribution. That is, element si j gives the share in
company i that is held by company j (= 1, . . ., n).3 It is assumed that the shares are all
non-negative and that their sum equals one. That is,
∑
j si j +
∑
k pik = 1 holds for all
i . In matrix notation we thus have Sin + Pim = in , where in for example indicates the
n-dimensional summation vector consisting of ones. This assumption simply states
that any secondary owner i is totally owned by principal and other intermediary owners.
P and S give the direct property distributions that are actually observed. Eliminat-
ing indirect ownership relations results in a total property distribution, which may be
significantly different from the observed ownership scheme. The first step in elimi-
nating indirect ownership relations, follows from the observation that primary owner
k directly holds a share pik in company i , but it also holds a share phk in company h
which holds a share sih in i itself. This holds for all h, so that primary owner k holds
an indirect share in i that amounts to
∑
h sih phk and which runs via one intermediate
owner. The link k → h → i thus involves two steps, which indicates the “distance”
between k and i . The “two-step” indirect property distribution is given by the matrix
SP. In the same way, primary owner k also holds an indirect share in i via two inter-
mediate owners and thus involving three steps (k → h → l → i). This yields the




h sil slh phk , which is element (i, k) of
matrix S2P. And so forth.
3 Usually, it is assumed that no secondary owner holds shares in itself, so that the main diagonal of S is
zero. However, as one of the referees rightly noted, this assumption is not always true because due to the
tax advantage of capital gains, the share repurchases have recently become the dominant payout policy for
corporations. From a mathematical point of view, it is no problem to allow for sii > 0.
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Taking all such indirect property distributions into consideration (next to the direct
initial property structure), gives the total property distribution. It is given by (I + S +
S2 + S3 + · · · )P, where I denotes the identity matrix. It is well known that the power
series expansion of a non-negative matrix S equals (I−S)−1, under certain conditions.
In the present context, it suffices to assume that for each secondary owner, there is a
primary owner that holds a positive share, i.e. matrix P has some positive element in
each row (see e.g. Takayama 1985, for a concise overview of mathematical details).
This implies that the total or “true” property distribution is given by the matrix
T = (I − S)−1P. (1)
Because Sin + Pim = in implies (I − S)in = Pim , we have in = (I − S)−1Pim = Tim .
This means that T satisfies the properties of a distribution. Note that in the end,
all property is owned—directly or indirectly—only by principal owners, and all the
secondary owners are left with nothing.
The primary property distribution matrix P with direct shareholding gives the direct
ownership relations that are also observed in practice. The indirect relations run via
one or more secondary owners and are given by the matrix4
Y = (S + S2 + S3 + · · · )P = [(I − S)−1 − I]P = T − P. (2)
If the value of the secondary owners is known, we can determine the value of the
property that is embedded in, for example, a 1% share in secondary owner j . Let v′
denote the row vector of the values for the firms (i.e. secondary owners). Then the j th
element of the row vector 0.01 × v′(I − S)−1 gives the value embedded in a 1% share
in secondary owner j . It is now also possible to evaluate the properties of the primary
owners. The kth element of the row vector v′(I − S)−1P = v′T gives the property
value of primary owner k. Note that the entire property of the secondary owners is
distributed over the primary owners, as follows from v′Tim = v′in .
3 A measure of ownership network complexity
Given the importance of the indirect relations (or linkages), we will study the complex-
ity of their underlying network. It turns out in the empirical analysis that this allows
us to get some insight into the “hidden property structures”. As will be clear from the
next section, the network complexity measure is a useful indicator of separation of
control and ownership rights, since the more complex is the system of non-negligible
ownership links, the larger is the control power on firms exerted by primary owners
through firms’ cross-holdings. Secondly, network complexity measures can be used
for comparative analysis. For instance, one economy can be compared with an other
in terms of the overall degree of complexity of indirect relations, which identifies the
market- or enterprise-orientedness of their ownership structures.
4 An alternative formulation yields Y = S(I + S + S2 + S3 + · · · )P = S(I − S)−1P = ST.
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The complexity of the indirect ownership relations between principal and interme-
diary owners is quantified by their weighted average distance. Distance is defined as
the number of intermediary owners, via whom the relation runs, plus one. For example
if the link between a primary owner k and a secondary owner i runs through secondary
owner h (i.e. k → h → i), the distance is 2. It indicates the number of steps that are
required to get from k to i . The weighted average distance is defined as one plus the
average number of participating intermediary owners. In determining the latter aver-
age, we use a technique originally developed in the context of input-output models by
Harthoorn (1988) and later extended by Dietzenbacher et al. (2005).
Consider the matrix of indirect property relations
Y = (S + S2 + S3 + · · · )P = SP + S2P + S3P + · · · (3)
Denote element (i, k) of matrix Sr P as [Sr P]ik . In building up the total indirect rela-
tion yik , a share [SP]ik/yik reflects all relations with distance 2 (i.e. running through
exactly one secondary owner). Note that element (i , k) of matrix SP yields ∑ j si j p jk ,
where the relationship si j p jk between primary owner k and secondary owner i runs
through secondary owner j . In the same way, the share [S2P]ik/yik gives the con-
nections between k and i with distance 3 that run via two secondary owners, because∑
j
∑
h sihsh j p jk . In general, the share [Sr P]ik/yik gives all indirect relationships
with distance r + 1 that require r secondary owners.
The weighted average distance between primary owner k and intermediary owner
i is given by the weighted average of the distances r +1 with weights [Sr P]ik/yik and
r = 1, 2, 3, … . That is,
(2 · [SP]ik + 3 · [S2P]ik + 4 · [S3P]ik + · · · + (r + 1) · [Sr P]ik + · · · )/yik
= {(1 · [SP]ik + 2 · [S2P]ik +3 · [S3P]ik +· · ·+r · [Sr P]ik +· · · )/yik}+1 (4)
The second line of (4) is due to the fact that the shares [Sr P]ik/yik are non-negative and
sum to one (i.e. ∑∞r=1[Sr P]ik/yik = 1). This shows that the weighted average distance
equals one plus the weighted average number of intermediary owners involved. The
numerator on the right hand side of expression (4) yields qi j , with Q =
∑∞
r=1 rSr P.






















Sr P = Y
using Eq. (3). Hence (I − S)Q = Y and thus Q = (I − S)−1Y. This yields a simple
expression for the weighted average number of secondary owners involved as defined
in (4). The weighted average distance of the indirect linkages yields (qik/yik) + 1.
In real world cases, the number of primary and secondary owners may become
substantial implying numerous indirect relations. The distance becomes larger and the
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number of paths with the same distance grows rapidly when the number of primary
and secondary owners increases. The complexity of this network of indirect relations
between primary owner k and secondary owner i is summarized by WADILik =
(qik/yik)+1, the weighted average distance of the indirect linkages (WADIL). A larger
distance indicates a more complex network involving a larger number of different paths
and is indicated by a larger value of WADILik .
Several remarks seem to be in place. First, it may happen that WADILik cannot be
determined, because yik = 0. This occurs for example if the matrix S is reducible. In
that case, the secondary owners can be reclassified into two clusters (I and II) and no
owner in cluster II holds a share in any of the owners in cluster I. If primary owner
k holds only shares in the secondary owners of cluster II, we have that there is no
indirect relation between k and secondary owners in cluster I. That is, yik = 0 for all
i in cluster I. Using partitioned matrices in Eq. (2), and denoting the direct property
distribution of primary owner k by the vector p and the indirect property distribution



















where, for example, SII,I indicates the shares in a secondary owner in cluster II that
are held by a secondary owner in cluster I, pII gives the shares in secondary owners
in cluster II that are held by primary owner k, and yII gives the indirect property of
secondary owners in cluster II as attributed to primary owner k. As a matter of fact,
we have yII = (I − SII,II)−1pII − pII.




(qik/yik) + 1 if yik > 0
0 if yik = 0
(5)
with Q = (I − S)−1Y. Note that whenever an indirect relation exists (i.e. yik > 0),
the number of secondary owners involved in this link cannot be smaller than one. There-
fore, also the average number of secondary owners (i.e. qik/yik) cannot be smaller
than one and WADILik is thus at least two.
Second, if we are interested in the total linkages (i.e. direct plus all indirect linkages)
between a primary and a secondary owner, matrix T can be analyzed in the same way.
We have T = (I−S)−1P = (I+S+S2 +· · ·+Sr +· · · )P and let r denote the number
of secondary owners that act as an intermediate in the total link between primary owner
k and secondary owner i . Note that this implies that a direct relation between k and
i has zero intermediary owners and involves one step. Then, the weighted average
distance or number of steps involved is, similar to (4), given by
(pik + 2 · [SP]ik + 3 · [S2P]ik + 4 · [S3P]ik + · · · + (r + 1) · [Sr P]ik + · · · )/tik
= {(0 · pik +1 · [SP]ik +2 · [S2P]ik +3 · [S3P]ik +· · ·+r · [Sr P]ik +· · · )/tik}+1
= (qik/tik) + 1
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(qik/tik) + 1 if tik > 0
0 if tik = 0
(6)
Note that if there are neither direct nor indirect linkages we have tik = 0 and it
makes no sense to examine the average distance. Hence, WADTLik = 0 by definition.
Also observe that in the case when there is a direct linkage but no indirect linkages, we
have that pik > 0 and yik = 0 imply qik = 0 and tik > 0, which yields WADTLik = 1.
In general, however, there are indirect linkages between k and i , implying that
qik/tik > 0. Values close to one indicate that the link is essentially of a direct nature,
while larger values express that the link is brought about by a complex network of
relations. The reason is that (if pik > 0) generally a large part of the total link is of a
direct nature and thus involves only one step (i.e. no intermediary owner). Note that
because Y = T − P, we have that WADTLik = (qik/tik) + 1 ≤ (qik/yik) + 1 =
WADILik . That is, the WADTL between k and i is smaller than the WADIL (unless,
of course, there are no direct linkages).5
4 An empirical application to the banking sector in the Czech Republic
For our empirical analysis, we have used the data in Turnovec (1999) for the banking
sector in the Czech Republic at the end of 1997.6 There are 13 primary owners and 12
secondary owners (see Appendix A for a list, see Turnovec 1999, for further details).
The primary property distribution P and the secondary property distribution S are
given in Appendix B.
4.1 Analyzing the ownership structure
For three secondary owners (SO5, SO8 and SO12) we observe that their shares are
held only by primary owners. Since the corresponding rows in S contain only zeros,
it is not possible to own a part of these secondary owners indirectly (i.e. via one or
more secondary owners). This implies that the relation between a primary owner and
these three secondary owners can only be direct. The matrix Y with indirect linkages
will thus show only zeros in the corresponding rows. In other words, for these three
secondary owners, the primary property distribution in matrix P tells the whole story.
Since there are no indirect linkages, also the matrix with the average distances of the
indirect linkages (WADILik) shows rows with only zeros for these secondary owners.
5 Absent of direct linkages, all total linkages are indirect. That is, if pik = 0 we have tik = yik and thus
WADTLik = WADILik .
6 See e.g. the study by Kenway and Klvacova (1996) on Czech financial institutions, who argue that
“cross-ownership is not only a web but also a mask, hiding the extent to which the state remains an owner”
(p. 800).
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Table 1 Matrix T with total linkages for the banking sector in the Czech Republic (in %)
PO1 PO2 PO3 PO4 PO5 PO6 PO7 PO8 PO9 PO10 PO11 PO12 PO13
SO1 59.23 0.38 0.28 15.04 0.32 0.06 2.15 0.37 0.09 2.33 0.25 0.37 19.11
SO2 38.40 3.71 2.74 0 3.13 0.58 20.86 0 0.86 0 0 3.61 26.11
SO3 50.90 0.03 0.02 0.23 0.02 0.00 0.14 13.01 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.02 35.58
SO4 31.49 0 0 0 18.20 3.36 0 0 5.02 0 0 0 41.93
SO5 19.59 26.51 19.59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25.78 8.53
SO6 14.84 0.10 0.07 3.77 0.08 0.01 0.54 0.09 0.02 30.58 0.06 0.09 49.74
SO7 14.80 0.10 0.07 3.76 0.08 0.01 0.54 0.09 0.02 30.58 10.06 0.09 39.79
SO8 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0
SO9 5.30 0.51 0.38 0 0.43 0.08 2.88 0 0.12 0 0 0.50 89.80
SO10 24.25 0.37 0.28 0 0.32 0.06 2.11 0 0.09 0 0 0.36 72.17
SO11 14.77 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.04 3.77 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 81.31
SO12 0 0 0 0 41.1 42.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 16.20
Very small numbers close to zero are denoted by 0.00
The matrices T and Y with the sizes of total and indirect shares in secondary
owners held by primary owners are given in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. Because all
the shares that are held by secondary owners are now accrued to primary owners, the
matrix Y has more positive elements than the matrix P. In analyzing this matrix Y, let
us focus first on the zero elements. Next to the rows for SO5, SO8 and SO12 (which
contain only zeros, as has been explained above), we observe that also the row for
SO4 contains primarily zeros. Note that SO4 is owned by four primary owners (PO1,
PO5, PO9, PO13) and one secondary owner (SO12). In its turn, however, all shares
in this secondary owner are held by primary owners PO5, PO6, and PO13. Therefore,
PO5, PO6, and PO13 are the only primary owners that have an indirect link to SO4,
so that y4k = WADIL4k = 0 for k = 5, 6, 13. Note that the indirect link between,
for example, PO5 and SO4 runs only through SO12. We have y45 = s4,12 × p12,5 =
0.0786 × 0.4110 = 0.0323. SO12 being the only intermediary owner also explains
why WADIL45 = WADIL46 = WADIL4,13 = 2 in Table 3 (which gives the matrix
with the WADILs). PO1 and PO9 have a direct link to SO4 (i.e. p41, p49 > 0), but
not an indirect link.
Additional zeros in Tables 2 and 3 are found for the linkages between primary
owners PO4, PO8, PO10 and PO11, and secondary owners SO2, SO9 and SO10. It
turns out that each of these primary owners, only holds shares in (and thus has a direct
link to) one or more secondary owners in the cluster SO1, SO3, SO6, SO7, SO11.
In addition, each of these secondary owners only holds shares in one or more other
members of the cluster. So, the indirect linkages only involve members of the cluster
and it is thus impossible to achieve a link between one of the four primary owners
(PO4, PO8, PO10 and PO11) and a secondary owner other than SO1, SO3, SO6, SO7,
SO11. This implies that all remaining entries (i.e. in rows 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 12) are zero
in the columns 4, 8, 10 and 11.
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Table 2 Matrix Y with indirect linkages for the banking sector in the Czech Republic (in %)
PO1 PO2 PO3 PO4 PO5 PO6 PO7 PO8 PO9 PO10 PO11 PO12 PO13
SO1 6.43 0.38 0.28 0.29 0.32 0.06 2.15 0.37 0.09 2.33 0.25 0.37 7.16
SO2 8.15 3.71 2.74 0 3.13 0.58 20.86 0 0.86 0 0 3.61 8.40
SO3 2.16 0.03 0.02 0.23 0.02 0.00 0.14 0.09 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.02 5.75
SO4 0 0 0 0 3.23 3.36 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.27
SO5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SO6 14.84 0.10 0.07 3.77 0.08 0.01 0.54 0.09 0.02 0.58 0.06 0.09 4.79
SO7 14.80 0.10 0.07 3.76 0.08 0.01 0.54 0.09 0.02 0.58 0.06 0.09 4.78
SO8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SO9 5.30 0.51 0.38 0 0.43 0.08 2.88 0 0.12 0 0 0.50 3.60
SO10 3.88 0.37 0.28 0 0.32 0.06 2.11 0 0.09 0 0 0.36 2.64
SO11 14.77 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.04 3.77 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 10.32
SO12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Very small numbers close to zero are denoted by 0.00
Table 3 Weighted average distances of indirect linkages (WADILik ) for the banking sector in the Czech
Republic
PO1 PO2 PO3 PO4 PO5 PO6 PO7 PO8 PO9 PO10 PO11 PO12 PO13
SO1 2.341 3.043 3.043 3.040 3.220 4.043 3.043 2.053 3.043 2.040 2.040 3.043 2.220
SO2 2 2 2 0 2.177 3 2 0 2 0 0 2 2.026
SO3 2.334 4.023 4.023 2.053 4.200 5.023 4.023 3.016 4.023 3.053 3.053 4.023 2.102
SO4 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
SO5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SO6 2.146 4.043 4.043 2.040 4.220 5.043 4.043 3.053 4.043 3.040 3.040 4.043 2.457
SO7 2.146 4.043 4.043 2.040 4.220 5.043 4.043 3.053 4.043 3.040 3.040 4.043 2.457
SO8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SO9 2.212 3 3 0 3.177 4 3 0 3 0 0 3 2.330
SO10 2.212 3 3 0 3.177 4 3 0 3 0 0 3 2.330
SO11 2.057 5.023 5.023 3.053 5.200 6.023 5.023 2.014 5.023 4.053 4.053 5.023 2.178
SO12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Another interesting issue is the case where some primary owner k has no direct
link to a certain secondary owner i (i.e. pik = 0), but substantial indirect linkages
(i.e. yik > 0). In this case, the information in the actually observed matrix P does not
at all reflect the true ownership structure. For example, PO7 has no direct share in SO2,
but indirectly it owns more than 20% of the property of SO2. Similarly, about 15% of
the property of SO6, SO7 and SO11 is indirectly held by PO1 although there is no direct
interest in them. The same applies to the majority of primary and secondary owners’
relations, but to a much lesser extent. Tables 2 and 3 also show that the presence of
a direct interest does not necessarily mean that there is an indirect link as well. For
instance, y41 = WADIL41 = 0, although p41 > 0.
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Fig. 1 Indirect connection between PO6 and SO11 for the banking sector in the Czech Republic
Note that in Table 3 we have used two types of numbers. Integer numbers (i.e.
without any decimals) are exact. For example, WADILik = 3 indicates that all indirect
connections between primary owner k and secondary owner i involve always exactly
three steps (i.e. two intermediary owners). Using the initial property distribution in P,
we see that e.g. WADIL93 = WADIL10,3 = 3 are both brought about through the
intermediation of SO5 and SO2. An exceptional case is underlying WADIL21 = 2.
All indirect linkages between PO1 and SO2 involve exactly two steps, but there are
two of such paths. One runs via SO4 and the other via SO5. Outcomes that are not
given as an integer reflect that there are at least multiple paths of different lengths.
Closer inspection of the numbers in Tables 2 and 3 suggests that there is an inverse
relationship between WADILik and the size yik of the indirect shareholdings. This
should not be too much of a surprise as follows from Eq. (4). A “large” value of
WADILik (say, 5 or so) indicates that the weight [Sr P]ik/yik must be reasonably large
for values r = 4, 5, and 6, for example. Thus [S4P]ik , [S5P]ik , and [S6P]ik have a
considerable contribution to yik . In general, however, [Sr P]ik declines rapidly when r
increases. This explains why in many cases “large” values of WADILik are found for
values yik close to zero. The correlation coefficient between size and weighted average
distance is –0.534 for the indirect linkages (based on the 95 cases with yik > 0). Hence,
smaller average distances are associated, to some extent, with larger indirect shares.
Table 3 shows that WADIL11, 6 = 6.023 is the largest, i.e. PO6 owns shares
of SO11 through 5.023 secondary owners on average. Using the primary and sec-
ondary property distributions in Appendix B, this connection is graphed in Fig. 1.
The graph shows that the “shortest” connection between PO6 and SO11 can be
established through three paths, each involving six steps (via five secondary owners:
SO12→SO4→SO2→SO1→SO3; SO12→SO4→SO2→SO9→SO3; and SO12→
SO4 → SO2→SO10→SO3). Because of mutual shareholdings (between the clus-
ter SO6, SO7, SO3 on the one hand and SO1 on the other hand, and between SO3
and SO11) there is in fact an infinite number of paths through which PO6 indirectly
owns property of SO11. It should be stressed, however, that the property attributed
to PO6 through paths involving eight or more steps is practically zero. Figure 1 also
graphs the connections of PO6 with any other secondary owner. For example, PO6
owns 0.58% of SO2 via exactly two intermediary owners (i.e. three steps), thus we
have y26 = 0.58 and WADIL2 6 = 3.
So far we have discussed the WADIL, which is of particular interest to detect the
interests that cannot be seen straightforwardly from the observed data. One might be
more interested in the total linkages between a principal and a secondary owner, no
matter whether they are direct or indirect. The total linkages are obtained from the
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Table 4 Weighted average distances of total linkages (WADTLik ) for the banking sector in the Czech
Republic
PO1 PO2 PO3 PO4 PO5 PO6 PO7 PO8 PO9 PO10 PO11 PO12 PO13
SO1 1.146 3.043 3.043 1.040 3.220 4.043 3.043 2.053 3.043 2.040 2.040 3.043 1.457
SO2 1.212 2 2 0 2.177 3 2 0 2 0 0 2 1.330
SO3 1.057 4.023 4.023 2.053 4.200 5.023 4.023 1.014 4.023 3.053 3.053 4.023 1.178
SO4 1 0 0 0 1.178 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 1.030
SO5 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
SO6 2.146 4.043 4.043 2.040 4.220 5.043 4.043 3.053 4.043 1.039 3.040 4.043 1.140
SO7 2.146 4.043 4.043 2.040 4.220 5.043 4.043 3.053 4.043 1.039 1.013 4.043 1.175
SO8 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
SO9 2.212 3 3 0 3.177 4 3 0 3 0 0 3 1.053
SO10 1.194 3 3 0 3.177 4 3 0 3 0 0 3 1.049
SO11 2.057 5.023 5.023 3.053 5.200 6.023 5.023 2.014 5.023 4.053 4.053 5.023 1.150
SO12 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
matrix T = P + Y. The number of intermediary owners involved in any specific link
is given by WADTLik = (qik/tik) + 1, expressing the weighted average distance
of total linkages between primary owner k and secondary owner i . The results are
given in Table 4. Note that WADTLik = 0 if tik = 0 which indicates that there is
no link, neither directly nor indirectly. The cases where tik = 0 and qik = 0 yield
WADTLik = 1 and reflect that there is a direct link but no indirect link. This implies
that any cell for which WADILik = 0 in Table 3, shows a 0 or a 1 in Table 4. No
indirect linkages (i.e. WADILik = 0) means that there are only direct linkages (i.e.
WADTLik = 1) or no linkages at all (i.e. WADTLik = 0).
Comparing the non-zero elements in Table 3 with their corresponding elements in
Table 4, shows that 0 < WADTLik < WADILik if and only if there is a direct link
between k and i (i.e. pik > 0).7 In most cases, the average distance falls substantially
once direct links are taken into account, because the direct linkage is a large part of the
total linkage. Hence, values of WADTLik that are close to one indicate that the link is
mainly direct. As was the case with WADILik , large values hint at the existence of a
complex network of relations that underlie a certain link.
One application of the proposed indirect measures is that they can be used for
comparative analyses. For example, the banking sector could be compared with another
sector, or the banking sector could be compared for different years, or the banking
sector in one country could be compared with that in another country. The overall
degree of complexity of the network of indirect relations is reflected by the overall
average of the weighted average distances (based on indirect or total linkages). In
our empirical application, this average of the weighted average distances is 1.949 for
the indirect linkages and 1.861 for the total linkages. The first indicator is the simple
7 WADILik > 0 implies yik > 0 and thus qik > 0 (because Q ≥ Y). Then tik > yik if and only if pik > 0,
and using the definitions in (5) and (6) straightforwardly proves the equivalence.
123
Ownership relations in the presence of cross-shareholding 201
average of all the WADILs and the second of the WADTLs. Recall that WADILik = 0
if there is no indirect linkage between k and i , and WADILik ≥ 2 otherwise. Similarly,
we have that WADTLik = 0 if there is no linkage between k and i , WADTLik = 1
if there is only a direct link, and WADTLik > 1 if there is an indirect link.8 Thus,
the results for the overall average distance indicate that shareholding linkages in the
Czech banking sector are brought about by a complex network of relations, and that
they cannot be associated with linkages of a direct nature only.
4.2 Ownership network complexity and separation of dividend and control rights
An important issue in the finance literature is the separation of control and dividend
rights due to pyramiding structure and cross-holdings (see e.g., La Porta et al. 1999,
2002; Bebchuk et al. 2000; Claessens et al. 2000; Faccio et al. 2001; Faccio and Lang
2002; Attig and Gadhoum 2003; Gadhoum 2005; Dorofeenko et al. 2008). One of
the main findings in these studies is that control (or voting) rights in the presence of
cross-holdings, pyramiding structures, and dual class shares usually exceed dividend
(or cash-flow) rights. Control rights are obtained from the so called “weakest link”
approach used in all studies cited above, except Dorofeenko et al. (2008) who propose
the “dominant shareholder” methodology for this purpose. In this subsection we will
argue that our measure of property network complexity may be used as an alternative.
As a very brief introduction to cash-flow and control rights, consider the following
simple hypothetical cases of a pyramidal structure:
Family a: 50% in firm α → 11% in β → 11% in γ → 10% in δ → 11% in ε
Family b: 10% in ε
The percentages represent the shares held in the “next” firm. For example, family
a holds 50% of the shares in firm α, which holds 11% of the shares in firm β, etcetera.
The question is what the cash flow (O) and control (C) rights of each family are in the
last firm ε.
Clearly, family b owns 10% of both O and C rights in ε, if we assume that there
are no dual-class shares (i.e., under the one-share-one-vote rule). For family a, the
ownership stake is equal to the product of all cash-flow rights along the property
chain. Hence, family a owns only 0.50 × 0.11 × 0.11 × 0.10 × 0.11 ≈ 0.007% of the
O stake in firm ε. According to the “weakest link” methodology, the C stake of family
a is equal to the minimum of the control stakes in the ownership chain. Hence, the
8 It should be emphasized that the WADILs (WADTLs) that are zero are included in calculating the overall
average indirect (total) linkages. Neglecting the zero-elements would give us the average of the weighted
average distances for the cases in which an indirect linkage exists. As an overall measure for comparative
purposes, however, this would have a clear drawback that is sketched by the following example. Consider
a sector with many secondary owners but no cross-shareholding except for a mutual interest between say
SO1 and SO2. The overall average distance could well be substantial if the zero-elements were not taken
into consideration, whereas the network of indirect relations is extremely simple. Taking all WADILs into
account would in this example yield a very low overall average, in line with the simplicity of the structure.
So, in determining the overall complexity of a network, it is important to take all possible connections into
consideration.
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family has 10% C rights in ε, provided that the threshold level is not larger than 10%.9
For family a, the separation of ownership and control thus is huge (O ≈ 0.007% and
C = 10%). According to the “weakest link” approach, both families have the same
control power in ε, although there is a large difference in their O stakes.
One might argue that it is more reasonable that the direct control of 10% for family
b is much larger in terms of real power than the indirect control of 10% via four
intermediate firms in case of family a. It thus seems that the “weakest link” approach
misses such incongruencies between O and C rights, which occur in the presence of
cross-ownership relations among firms. Precisely these relations are fully captured by
our notion of distance.
Following the above line of reasoning, one might expect that countries with the
largest (smallest) separation of ownership and control have a more (less) complex
network of ownership relations. Consequently, one would expect the proposed distance
measures to be large (small). Claessens et al. (2000), Faccio and Lang (2002), Attig and
Gadhoum (2003) and Gadhoum (2005) report the following O/C ratios (in ascending
order). Japan: 0.602; Switzerland: 0.740; Italy: 0.743; Indonesia: 0.784; Singapore:
0.794; Germany: 0.842: Canada: 0.850; Philippines: 0.908; Portugal: 0.924; France:
0.930; USA: 0.940; Thailand: 0.941; and Spain: 0.941. Some average O/C ratios are
Canada-USA: 0.895; Western Europe: 0.868; and East Asia: 0.746. These results are in
line with the reciprocal relationship between complexity and the O/C ratio. In East Asia
and Japan in particular, firms are historically interlinked through strong shareholding
interlocks, yielding complex ownership structures. This suggests that our notion of
distance can be considered as an alternative measure of separation of ownership and
control, fully taking into account means of enhancing control such as non-pyramidal
cross-ownerships (both one-sided and reciprocal).10
Also Dorofeenko et al. (2008) observe that “for more complicated cross-ownership
the product of shares and the minimum share along the chain are insufficient statistics
for ownership and control, respectively”. This implies that the “weakest link” approach
is suitable only for pyramidal cross-ownership relations, where the chains of ownership
stakes are easily tractable. Hence, for non-pyramidal cross-ownership relations more
general measures for O and C rights are required. They suggest to trace a controlling
primary owner for each firm, and propose the methodology that rests on construction
of control assignments on the base of “dominant shareholder” theorem that identifies
controllers according to relative majority of (both direct and indirect) voting shares.
Shortly, their approach is as follows. The n×m matrix C gives the control coefficients.
Its typical element cik is an indicator function that takes a positive value if company
i(= 1, . . ., n) is controlled by primary owner k(= 1, . . ., m), and zero otherwise. Then
the share of votes in company i by some primary owner k is given by pik +∑ j si j c jk ,
9 It should be mentioned that usually only control stakes that exceed certain threshold levels (typically 10
and 20%) are considered.
10 It should be noted that dual-class shares are not covered by our approach. At the same time, multiple
class shares are not the most common equity structure. According to Bebchuk et al. (2000), the reason is that
“the corporate law of some jurisdictions restricts both the voting ratio between high- and low-ratio shares
and the numerical ratio between high- and low-vote shares that a firm is permitted to issue”. The studies
mentioned above, report that only 19.91, 16.10, and 8.19% of firms in, respectively, Europe, Canada, and
the US issue multiple class equity as a mean to enhance control.
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Table 5 Control rights according to the “weakest link” approach (without threshold) for the Czech banking
sector (in %)
PO1 PO2 PO3 PO4 PO5 PO6 PO7 PO8 PO9 PO10 PO11 PO12 PO13
SO1 65.70 12.90 12.90 14.75 12.90 10.66 12.90 2.80 7.82 7.60 2.50 12.90 24.85
SO2 61.43 14.00 14.00 0 17.18 7.86 20.86 0 5.02 0 0 14.00 43.42
SO3 55.04 6.30 6.30 1.53 6.30 6.30 6.30 12.92 6.30 1.53 1.53 6.30 36.13
SO4 31.49 0 0 0 22.81 7.86 0 0 5.02 0 0 0 48.52
SO5 19.59 26.51 19.59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25.78 8.53
SO6 25.05 12.90 12.90 14.75 12.90 10.66 12.90 2.80 7.82 32.50 2.50 12.90 69.80
SO7 24.99 12.90 12.90 14.75 12.90 10.66 12.90 2.80 7.82 35.10 10.00 12.90 59.86
SO8 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0
SO9 13.80 13.80 13.80 0 13.80 7.86 13.80 0 5.02 0 0 13.80 100
SO10 30.47 10.10 10.10 0 10.10 7.86 10.10 0 5.02 0 0 10.10 79.63
SO11 29.01 6.30 6.30 1.53 6.30 6.30 6.30 12.92 6.30 1.53 1.53 6.30 100
SO12 0 0 0 0 41.10 42.70 0 0 0 0 0 0 16.20
which in matrix form yields P + SC. After this reassignment of shares, the remaining
“uncontrolled” voting shares reduce to S(I − diag(Cim)), where diag(Cim) is the
n×n diagonal matrix with the row sums of C along its diagonal. The authors show that
relative majority, unlike absolute majority as the criterion relevant for control, ensures
that every firm is controlled only by primary owner(s), because a largest shareholder
always exists. Thus the last matrix of “uncontrolled” shares is a zero matrix implying
that Cim = in .11 So the control rights are given by the matrix P + SC, which also add
to one for each firm i , i.e. (P + SC)im = in .
In the remainder of this subsection, we compare our WADTL and WADIL measures
with the “weakest link” and “dominant shareholder” approaches, applied to the Czech
banking sector. Control rights of primary owners according to the “weakest link”
methodology are given in Table 5, where for the moment we do not impose any
threshold level on their sizes (hence, the row sums are all bigger than one except for
SO5, SO8, and SO12). To illustrate, we examine the derivation of control rights for
the case of PO6, which is also graphically illustrated in Fig. 2.
All possible shareholding links among secondary owners are illustrated in Fig. 2.
Assuming the one-share-one-vote rule, first, it is easy to see that PO6 has 42.70%
control and cash flow stakes in SO12. The minimum stake in the ownership chain
until SO4 is 7.86%, which is thus the control stake of PO6 in SO4. By the same logic,
PO6 owns 7.86% of control rights in SO2, SO9, and SO10. To find the control stake
in SO3, consider the three ownership chains that pass through SO1, SO9 and SO10,
respectively. Then the corresponding control share is equal to the sum of the minimum
stakes along these three chains is 6.30% (= 1.53 + 1.21 + 3.56%) gives the control
11 The control coefficients satisfy the following two conditions. (1) If cik > 0, then pik +
∑
j si j c jk ≥
pil +
∑
j si j c jl for all l = 1, . . ., m, for all k = 1, . . ., m, and all i, j = 1, . . ., n; and (2)
∑m
k=1 cik = 1
for all i = 1, . . ., n. See Dorofeenko et al. (2008) for further details.
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Fig. 2 Identification of control
rights of PO6 according to the
“weakest link” methodology
(without threshold).
Note: S stands for the size of
shareholding between secondary
owners, C– control rights of






























rights of PO6 in SO3. Similarly, the control stake of PO6 in SO1 equals 10.66%,
the sum of the minimum stakes in the links via SO2 and SO3 (= 7.86 + 2.80%).
Notice that the mutual cross-holdings of SO1 with SO6 and of SO1 with SO7 have
been disregarded. The reason is that we would consider such mutual links only if SO1
owned at least 50% of SO6 and SO7, which in turn own SO1.12 Since the control stake
of 10.66% in SO1 is smaller than the ownership stakes of the SO1 in SO6 and SO7,
we have that PO6 owns 10.66% of the control rights in SO6 and SO7 as well. Finally,
the control stake of PO6 in SO11 is 6.30%, equal to that in SO3 and smaller than the
direct stake of SO3 in SO11 (i.e., 29.01%).
Because our dataset is fairly small, the matrix of control coefficients on the basis
of relative majority of votes is easily found. The underlying intuition is thoroughly
explained in Dorofeenko et al. (2008). For a small dataset the control coefficients can
be derived iteratively as follows. First, take the n × m matrix C(0) that has unity in
all cells that correspond to positive cells in the matrix P, and zeroes elsewhere. Next,
from the secondary property distribution matrix S, the firms are found that are not
owned by any other secondary owner. In our case, these are SO5, SO8, and SO12.
Because these firms cannot be owned indirectly, we search in the corresponding rows
of P for the shareholder(s) with the largest stake. These are assigned a positive value
in the corresponding cell(s) of C(0), and the remaining elements become zero. If there
is more than one shareholder with the same (largest) stake, they receive equal control
coefficients, such that the sum of coefficients equals one. From P in Appendix B, it
follows that c(0)5,2 = 1, c(0)8,7 = 1, c(0)12,6 = 1, and c(0)ik = 0 for i = 5, 8, and 12, and all
other k’s in these rows. Now, in the second stage we compute P + SC(0), find from
the matrix S firms that are owned only by one other secondary owner, and for these
12 If this would have been the case, we would have added 5.1 and 2.5% to the 10.66% of PO6 control rights
in SO1.
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Table 6 The control assignment matrix for the banking sector in the Czech Republic
PO1 PO2 PO3 PO4 PO5 PO6 PO7 PO8 PO9 PO10 PO11 PO12 PO13
SO1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SO2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
SO3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SO4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
SO5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SO6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
SO7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
SO8 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
SO9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
SO10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
SO11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
SO12 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 7 Control rights according to the “dominant shareholder” approach for the Czech banking sector
(in %)
PO1 PO2 PO3 PO4 PO5 PO6 PO7 PO8 PO9 PO10 PO11 PO12 PO13
SO1 55.60 0 0 14.75 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 29.65
SO2 30.25 14.00 0 0 0 0 20.86 0 0 0 0 0 34.89
SO3 50.27 0 0 0 0 0 0 12.92 0 0 0 0 36.81
SO4 31.49 0 0 0 14.97 7.86 0 0 5.02 0 0 0 40.66
SO5 19.59 26.51 19.59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25.78 8.53
SO6 25.05 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 0 0 44.95
SO7 24.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 10 0 35.01
SO8 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0
SO9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
SO10 20.37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 79.63
SO11 29.01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 70.99
SO12 0 0 0 0 41.10 42.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 16.2
corresponding rows again search the largest shareholder(s) in P + SC(0), and assign a
positive value of control coefficients in C(0), which after this adjustment is denoted by
C(1). Then compute P + SC(1), and the same procedure is applied until every firm is
assigned to some primary owner(s). Table 6 gives the final control assignment matrix
Cfinal and Table 7 the matrix of control rights P + SCfinal according to the “dominant
shareholder” methodology. Note that the conditions in footnote 11 are satisfied.
In order to examine the relation between network complexity measures and the
degrees of separation of C and O rights, we first note that in measuring distance
focusing entirely on either T or WADTL (or similarly on either Y or WADIL) would
be misleading. The drawback of only considering the matrix T and/or Y is that it does
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Table 8 Simple correlation between ownership network complexity measures and the degrees of separation
(C-O) of control and dividend rights
(C − O)ik 156 observations Average (C¯ − O¯)k 13 observations
WL10 WL20 DS WL10 WL20 DS
WADTL 0.318 −0.026 −0.014 WADTL 0.253 −0.284 −0.145
WADTL2 0.315 0.063 0.059 WADTL2 0.583 0.728 0.470
WADTL5 0.181 0.282 0.245 WADTL5 0.548 0.913 0.746
WADTL10 0.212 0.358 0.310 WADTL10 0.575 0.920 0.739
WADIL 0.377 0.085 −0.023 WADIL 0.332 −0.126 −0.025
WADIL2 0.479 0.385 0.050 WADIL2 0.630 0.843 0.600
WADIL5 0.301 0.451 0.238 WADIL5 0.524 0.860 0.731
WADIL10 0.213 0.357 0.306 WADIL10 0.460 0.681 0.566
DS −0.070 0.089 DS 0.416 0.817
C − O is the difference between control and ownership rights. (C − O)ik does so for the interests of
primary owner k(= 1, . . . , 13) in in each secondary owner i(= 1, . . ., 12), (C¯ − O¯)k takes the average over
the secondary owners. WL and DS stand for, respectively, the “weakest link” and “dominant shareholder”
approaches of identifying control rights. WL10 means that the threshold level for control rights is 10%
(otherwise the corresponding cell in Table 5 is set to zero). WADTL5 (WADIL5) takes the positive values
of WADTL (WADIL) if the corresponding total (indirect) ownership is at least 5%
not reflect the complexity of a certain relation, since their elements do not allow to
distinguish how many intermediary owners are involved in a certain link. The limitation
of focusing entirely on WADTL and/or WADIL is that the size of the total and/or
indirect linkages is ignored. The only issue that matters is the “distance” between a
primary and a secondary owner. For example, for the case with the largest WADIL
(which was graphed in Fig. 1), we have that t11,6 = y11,6 = 0.00, which is a very
negligible share. The issue thus arises whether it makes sense to consider this specific
relation. To solve this problem both types of indicator are combined. That is, we take
the average distance into account only if the size of the linkage is sufficiently large,
using a threshold level.
Table 8 gives the simple correlations between the various indicators. Note that
ownership (O) in all cases is represented by the matrix T. First, the relation between
control and ownership differences (C-O), with C measured by the “weakest link” (WL)
and “dominant shareholder” (DS) approaches, is given in the bottom row of Table 8.
The full sample takes C-O into account for every pair of primary and secondary owner
(thus, n × m = 12 × 13 = 156 observations). No significant correlation is found
between the WL and the DS indicator of separation of O and C. However, if the
average is taken over all secondary owners (for each primary owner, which yields
m = 13 observations), positive correlations are found. Moreover, the correlations are
much higher with a threshold level of 20% for the “weakest link” control rights. Hence,
for the Czech banking sector, the two “standard” approaches result in approximately
the same outcomes for the separation of O and C when the average control rights of the
primary owner are compared, while the results differ significantly when all specific
control rights are considered.
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Next, we consider the results for the case where the control rights are obtained
from the distance measures WADIL and WADTL. When size is not taken into account
(i.e. distance indicators are considered without any threshold), there is no clear link
between the WL and DS measures of separation of C and O, and the corresponding
distances. However, once ownership size is taken into account (with threshold levels
of 2, 5 or 10%) the WADILs and WADTLs show a positive correlation with the WL
and DS measures for C and O differences, i.e. the wedge between C and O rights is
greater (i.e. C-O is larger) when there is more complex network of ownership links
(i.e. when WADTL and WADIL are larger).
Focusing on the cases where a threshold level is applied to the distance measures
yields the following conclusions. First, the correlation is larger for average indicators
(in the right panel of Table 8) than for the individual indicators (in the left panel).
Second, in the full sample the correlations of C-O measures from the “weakest link”
approach are on average larger when WADILs are used than when WADTLs are
used, while the opposite holds for C-O measures computed by the DS approach.
In the sample with C-O measures averaged over secondary owners, the correlations
are stronger for WADIL than for WADTL at the 2% threshold level, whereas the
opposite holds for the 5 and 10% threshold levels. Thus, for higher threshold levels
(imposed on total and indirect linkages), WADTL measures are preferred in indicating
C and O gap. This is because the WADTLs take direct and indirect shareholding
linkages into account and both matter in determining the control power of a primary
owner.
The empirical results clearly suggest that the distance measures WADTL and
WADIL can be considered as alternative measures of the degree of separation of C
and O due to pyramiding structures and cross-holding. When compared to the WL and
DS methodologies, using WADIL and WADTL as indicators of separation of C and
O has several clear advantages. First, its computation is extremely simple. Second, in
contrast to the WL approach and similar to the DS methodology, the notion of distance
takes all possible webs of property relations due to cross-ownership into full account.
Furthermore, the distances are weighted by their corresponding contributions to total
and indirect links, which make them preferable to, say, the minimum distance approach
used in sociology literature. Third, unlike the DS approach, there is no such notion
as the multiplicity of control assignments (hence multiple control rights values).13
Consequently, every initial primary and secondary property distributions have unique
WADTL and WADIL matrices. Fourth, like DS approach, WADIL and WADTL also
consider the notion of “management control”, when a firm is (partially) controlled by
an owner without ownership in dividend rights at all.14 On the other hand, similar to the
DS methodology, the distance concept has a disadvantage that it focuses on the effects
of cross-shareholding and does not consider other control arrangements, like dual-
class shares and voting caps. But given our observations mentioned in the beginning
13 To deal with this issue, Dorofeenko et al. (2008) introduce the notion of control “tightness” that gives
the maximally stable control assignment.
14 In our empirical application this applies to significant indirect ownership of PO7 in SO2, or PO1 in SO6,
SO7, and SO11 with zero direct dividend rights.
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of this subsection, we expect the bias from the one-share-one-vote assumption to be
small.15
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied ownership relations between primary owners (such as
individuals and the state) and secondary owners (such as companies and banks). In the
presence of cross-shareholding among secondary owners, the property structure may
become quite complex. Cross-shareholding is widely observed in modern economies
and is an important characteristic of Japanese, German and Swedish business groups
in particular. The observed property distribution reflects only direct shareholding and
may be highly misleading because it hides the true property distribution. This true
property distribution can only be obtained by taking also all indirect shareholding into
full account. As a consequence, all property that is held by secondary owners accrues
to the primary owners. The true property distribution allows for the calculation of
the total property that is embedded in a 1% share in some corporation and the total
property that is held by some primary owner.
For analyzing the ownership relations or linkages, two aspects are important.
These are the size of the indirect or total (i.e. direct and indirect) linkages between
a primary owner and a secondary owner, and the average distance of the linkages
between the two. The last is obtained from the average number of secondary own-
ers via whom the relation runs. The average distance indicates the complexity of
the indirect linkages between a primary and a secondary owner and is taken into
account only for the important linkages (i.e. those that are larger than a pre-specified
threshold).
The methodology has been applied to the banking sector in the Czech Republic,
which allowed us to get some insight into the “hidden property structures” of this
sector. The complexity of the network of relations between primary and secondary
owners was quantified. There is ample evidence that indirect ownership relations play
a crucial role in the Czech banking sector.
Further, we found a clear link between ownership complexity measures proposed
in this paper and the degree of separation of dividend and control rights, largely
investigated in the finance literature. The idea is that the more complex the network
of non-negligible relations is, the larger the degree of control enhancement due to
cross-shareholding links among firms. Hence, the larger the difference is between
the control and the ownership stakes of primary owners in secondary owners. The
empirical results confirm this for the Czech banking sector.
As a final remark, it should be noted that the empirical analysis of the Czech banking
sector was carried out as if it were a closed, domestic system. However, some of the
primary owners are in fact secondary owners in other countries. It may thus be the
case that say 20% of the property of one of the Czech investment funds accrues to a
15 Dorofeenko et al. (2008), in supporting their assumption of the absence of other control arrangements,
argue that “… these other control devices will most likely reinforce the control assignment emerging from
the pure one-share-one vote arrangement, as they are presumably designed by controlling shareholders”.
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German bank, for example. This points at foreign holding of Czech property. In its
turn, it is in principle possible that e.g. the Czech National Bank holds (directly and
indirectly) 50% of this German bank. This would imply then that only 10% of the
property of this Czech investment fund flows abroad, while 10% accrues to the Czech
National Bank.
It is clear that the first part (i.e. foreign ownership of Czech property) of the exam-
ple above is included in our analysis. The second part (i.e. Czech ownership of for-
eign property), however, is not. To do so, would at least require detailed information
on shareholding in Germany. In general, if international cross-shareholding occurs,
insight into the property structure and the international ownership relations would
require a full interregional input-output framework (see e.g. Miller and Blair 1985
for an excellent introduction, and Dietzenbacher and Romero 2007, for an applica-
tion of distance to interregional production chains). That is, the necessary information
would be given by expanded initial property distribution matrices P and S. Element
pRUik would give the share in secondary owner i in country R, that is held by primary
owner k in country U . Similarly, s RUi j would indicate the share in secondary owner i in
country R, that is held by secondary owner j in country U . Given the ongoing interna-
tionalization of shareholding, constructing and analyzing a full-fledged interregional
database will be a major challenge for the future.
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Appendix A. The list of primary and secondary owners of the banking sector
in the Czech Republic
PO1 – Fond národního majetku (Fund of National Property), state agency
PO2 – ˇCeská národní banka (Czech National Bank), central bank
PO3 – Ministerstvo financí (Ministry of Finance), state agency
PO4 – Sdružení meˇst (Association of Municipalities)
PO5 – Bank Holding, non-state
PO6 – J. Ring stock company, non-state
PO7 – First Privatization Holding, non-state
PO8 – The Bank of New York
PO9 – Nomura Group
PO10 – The Midland Bank
PO11 – The Bankers Trust Investment
PO12 – Slovak Republic
PO13 – minority investors
SO1 – ˇCeská sporˇitelna (Czech Saving Bank)
SO2 – ˇCeská pojišt’ovna (Czech Insurance)
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SO3 – Komercˇní banka (Commercial Bank)
SO4 – Invesicˇní a poštovní banka (Investment and Post bank)
SO5 – ˇCeskoslovenská obchodní banka (Czecho-Slovak Trade Bank)
SO6 – Sporˇitelní privatizacˇní fond – ˇCeský (investment fund)
SO7 – Sporˇitelní privatizacˇní fond – výnosový (investment fund)
SO8 – První privatizacˇní fond (investment fund)
SO9 – První investicˇní fond (investment fund)
SO10 – Restitucˇní investicˇní fond (investment fund)
SO11 – Investicˇní privatizacˇní fond Komercˇní banky (investment fund)
SO12 – Vojenskeˇ stavby (stock company)
Appendix B. The initial property distribution for the banking sector
in the Czech Republic
Primary property distribution – P
PO1 PO2 PO3 PO4 PO5 PO6 PO7 PO8 PO9 PO10 PO11 PO12 PO13
SO1 52.80 14.75 11.95
SO2 30.25 17.71
SO3 48.74 12.92 29.83
SO4 31.49 14.97 5.02 40.66
SO5 19.59 26.51 19.59 25.78 8.53
SO6 30.00 44.95





SO12 41.10 42.70 16.20
Secondary property distribution – S
SO1 SO2 SO3 SO4 SO5 SO6 SO7 SO8 SO9 SO10 SO11 SO12
SO1 10.10 2.80 5.10 2.50
SO2 17.18 14.00 20.86
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